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Creative Engagements Indeed! Open “Disciplines,” 
The Allure of Others, and Intellectual Fertility 






Just like asking after love suggests loneliness, asking after creative 
engagements invokes lack, perhaps even hunger.  How many of us in the 
academy, to say nothing of the cubicle stalag, feel deeply disengaged? 
How many suspect that, although we work ostentatiously enough, our 
work could be done by others, or not at all, and so does not offer us the 
opportunities to be authors (parents, gods)?  Are we neither creative nor 
engaged? 
To shift imagery, we may sense that the intellectual jobs in which 
we find ourselves―that do so much to define us―were badly chosen.  We 
were so ignorant back then, before graduate school, and so it is hardly 
unusual to feel that our careers have somehow failed to deliver what we 
came for, even if we are objectively fortunate, have good jobs, a degree of 
reputation, etc.  Many academics feel that truth or at least intellectual 
satisfaction and in that sense engagement, to say nothing of creativity, the 
possibility of making something that will last a while, lies somewhere 
else.  This feeling may be accepted, perhaps written off as common middle 
age disillusionment.  The young at heart, however, may feel that if they 
                                                        
1 This essay stems from a presentation at the “Creative Engagements Workshop,” 
University of Hong Kong, April 25-26, 2014.  My hearty thanks to Brian Moeran 
and Dixon Wong for providing the occasion, and to George Marcus and Jack 
Schlegel for comments.  The errors in judgment and otherwise are all mine. 
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have gone astray, then all the more reason to keep moving.  Thus arises 
the interdisciplinary desire in the soul of the disappointed professional, 
the desire to cross fences. 
In that psychological situation, the openness, even weakness, of 
one’s own discipline may be an intellectual opportunity, a disguised 
strength.  By “weak discipline” I mean, as a first cut, a discipline in which 
adepts have a high degree of willingness to accept and even use other 
disciplines.  Conversely, the adepts of a strong or closed discipline see 
their questions as mostly or even exclusively answerable in terms of the 
discipline.  Mathematics is probably the ultimate strong discipline; my 
contention is that law and anthropology are open disciplines.  Not only 
that, anthropology and law are, or should be, open to one another. 
Weak disciplines are less closely guarded; low fences are easy to 
climb. To be more specific: this essay tries to address, and perhaps 
modestly allay, common anxieties about living as professionals 
(intellectuals? knowledge workers? symbol manipulators? Academics?―it 
begins already) by exploring how the ill-defined characters of both 
“anthropology” and “law” may offer intellectual opportunity, and perhaps 
even the chance to be creative, to feel that work is worthwhile and in that 
sense to be engaged. 
 
I. Law as an Open Discipline 
Law schools in the United States are with varying fervor but always 
publically in favor of multidisciplinary approaches to law.  There are 
numerous reasons for this.  Law is a second degree – so all law students 
have studied something else in college.  All of my students are in their mid 
20s or older.  In the last generation or so, it has become increasingly 
common, on some faculties the norm, for law school professors to have 
advanced degrees in other disciplines.  The cross training of US legal 
academics runs across the political spectrum.  Law and economics is a 
staple at the most conservative institutions.  Legal history, law and 
sociology, and so forth are all common. 
SUNY Buffalo Law School is something of a leader in this regard.  
We credibly claim to be one of the preeminent “law and ____” places in the 
country.  So, by way of example, we have for over 35 years had an 
endowed “Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy” that combines the 
efforts of the law school with the social science faculties.  Fourteen 
members of our faculty have PhDs in another subject, in addition to their 
law degrees (I am not one).   Of perhaps particular interest here, we have 
five faculty members with PhDs in either anthropology or sociology.  So, 
at least as a first cut, it would seem that law has fully taken the 
interdisciplinary turn, at least at some schools.   In a law faculty 
discussion it would almost gauche to say that we should approach social 
questions from multiple, mutually enriching, perspectives.  To do 
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otherwise would be literally myopic, and we professors know that 
already. 
This conclusion, however, is somewhat hasty.  As suggested, 
questions of interdisciplinarity implicitly raise questions of what 
constitutes this or that discipline, and even what is meant by an 
“academic discipline.”  That is, understanding law in interdisciplinary 
terms implies that we have two disciplines here, much as “international 
law” tends to presume the nation that is precisely at issue.  Apart from the 
administrative requirements of the bureaucratic university, it is hardly 
obvious that law (or even anthropology, as discussed below) should be 
understood, at a deep level, in terms of received notions of what 
constitutes an academic discipline.   
There is certainly little consensus on what constitutes legal 
education, beyond the rather crude learning required to pass the bar 
exam.  There is no substantive consensus on what should be on the bar 
exam, either, but in light of the institutional inertia at issue―the entire 
legal profession―the bar exam is unlikely to change much or quickly.  
Since passage of the exam is a sine qua non of the license, and the vast 
majority of law students seek to be licensed, schools perforce teach bar 
courses.    
But that is rather prosaic: law must be more than teaching to a test 
rather circumstantially composed.  But what?  To many legal academic, 
the mere suggestion of a single idea, question, or approach (along the 
lines of “economics concerns the problem of scarcity”) that (i) unites legal 
research, and that (ii) is relatively objective, to be discovered and studied 
with cold dispassion, i.e., is THE object of research, seems so implausible 
as to suggest bad faith, no doubt some hegemonic agenda. 
I do not mean to overstate the matter.  Lawyers in the United States 
of course recognize one another, have distinctive ways of knowing, 
talking, and operating.  Reaching back, the study of law is central to the 
emergence of the University in the West, i.e., it could be argued that not 
only is law a discipline, it is the first of disciplines (though the physicians 
and the theologians may demur).  The problem is that while it is not too 
difficult to gain “we know it when we see it” understandings of law in the 
university (and indeed in society writ large), such loose understandings 
are intellectually, and ultimately psychologically, impoverished, and so 
unsatisfying in a very specific sense.  The academic locates herself  in a 
field, and if the field is ill-defined, then the academic is not located.  
Worse, the academic cannot claim exclusive authority (a very legal 
concept) vis-a-vis other academics over the domain.  The bounds of the 
domain are fluid and so easy to contest.  In a world in which a career, and 
so a sense of public self, is founded on (intellectual) authority, this puts 
the law professor in a precarious position, only somewhat mitigated by 
the reflected glory of law in an intensely legalistic society.  From this 
perspective, we may think of law as a “weak” discipline, incessantly 
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invaded yet so central as to be sort of immortal, like Belgium in European 
history. 
At the same time, the very prevalence of “law and ___” suggests that 
legal scholars feel the need to import [something] to shore up the 
borders.  In the relatively short history of American legal education in the 
context of the University (as opposed to legal education via 
apprenticeship), there have been numerous efforts to “ground” law, or 
what often comes to the same thing, to reform it, by importing wisdom 
from other fields.  Christopher Columbus Langdell, the first dean of 
Harvard Law School, argued that the jumble of the common law could be 
rationalized on the analogy of chemistry, with appellate courts as 
“laboratories” and decisions as “data.”  A subsequent dean of Harvard, 
Roscoe Pound, shifted the regulative ideal to his field, biology, which 
allowed for ideas of evolution, and nods towards contemporary German 
historical thought.  Law was, in several senses of the word, a progressive 
undertaking. 
A generation later, in the 1930s, under the banner of “American 
Legal Realism,” law professors loudly disavowed their allegiance to 
“doctrine,” which was seen as endlessly malleable and therefore not 
objective and consequently unfit to comprise the discipline of law.  
Instead, American legal realists said -- quoting Holmes -- that they were 
going to treat law as it was in fact, and many pledged troth with the social 
sciences, and not incidentally, the New Deal.  But, as John Henry Schlegel 
describes with some wickedness, the entire project didn’t really “take.” 
Doctrine never really went away, not least for practical reasons.  Doctrine 
is and was the easiest way to teach rules, and for that matter to teach 
students how to make arguments that sound plausible to judges and 
defensible to clients, and the easiest thing to test on the bar exam.  Nor 
did law professors, by and large, get very far as social scientists. Working 
out the New Deal, or later, the Civil Rights movement, or environmental 
law, or even making a lot of money for one’s clients on Wall Street, 
evidently seemed a much more sensible use of intellectual horsepower 
than endless noodling over what “really” happens in society. 
Beginning around the time of Vietnam, law and economics scholars 
extended the sociological project of American legal realism by arguing 
that law should aim to achieve economically efficient outcomes conceived 
under a hypothesized optimal set of rules.  That is, the vocabulary and 
grammar of neoclassical economics were used in an explicitly normative 
(generally speaking, conservative) program of law reform.  As a 
movement, law and economics was vastly successful, but given its fairly 
overt political engagements (some of which were astonishingly creative), 
difficult to see as particularly wissenschaftlich.   
Unsurprisingly, shortly thereafter, a number of scholars whom we 
may generally speaking call “critical” (there was a “Critical Legal Studies 
Movement”) attempted to redefine law by extending the skepticism of 
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American Legal Realism toward doctrine and judicial decisions toward 
law itself.  Drawing on various social sciences, literary theory, and an 
increasingly implausible Marxian impulse, as well as the morally 
reassuring notion that law was a form of advocacy to be used for the 
disenfranchised, critical legal thought argued that law tends to entrench 
(presumptively unjust) hierarchies.  Aided by social sciences and the 
humanities, the function of legal scholarship was to reveal such injustice, 
thereby unsettling the authority of (unjust) law, and paving the way for 
new, more just, law.  Again, interesting, but hard to understand as an 
objective program of research.  And if no objective program of research 
can be stated, it seems unlikely that law should be understood as an 
autonomous discipline. 
I should mention that the multidisciplinary ideal has not gone 
unchallenged.  There have long been efforts to make law an autonomous 
discipline (to make the fences defensible) by restricting the domain of law 
to obviously “legal” output―statutes, judicial decisions, and the like. We 
might, broadly speaking, call this the positivist impulse: law is what the 
sovereign posits through legal institutions.  This impulse is rather more 
dominant in legal studies outside the United States. 
The problems with treating law as an autonomous discipline are 
manifold, and acute in a society like the United States.  In the United 
States, law is everywhere.  Even those areas of life that we regard as 
“private” are often intensely legally articulated.  Officers of a corporation, 
for example, are empowered to act, or not, by law, but also by the 
business of the firm itself, which is also a social and economic and 
historical matter.  Americans think about lots of things, ranging from 
sports to sex, in legal(istic) terms, a characteristic noted by Tocqueville.  
And building on Tocqueville with a dash of Rousseau, we might think that 
any large (and diverse and therefore somewhat alienated) society will 
perforce turn to law to regulate relations that cannot be felt. Consider, in 
this regard, European law.   
At a deeper level, even “prelegal” relations might be felt to be the 
real law.  As Holmes has it, law comprises the “felt necessities” of an era.  
And so we Americans sometimes decide that duly passed “laws” are 
unconstitutional, i.e., not really law, in the name of some higher law 
embodied in the Constitution, truths that we (now) hold to be “self 
evident,” as Jefferson has it in the Declaration.  See, generally, civil rights, 
latterly gay marriage. 
 
II. Cultural anthropology as an Open Discipline 
If so inclined, for an undergraduate textbook perhaps, one might define 
anthropology etymologically, as the study of mankind.  If the purpose of 
having a discipline is to organize and focus thought, however, then such a 
broad understanding does not help much.  
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Not unlike law, however, in practice and for many years it was not 
difficult to tell what counted as anthropology.  Traditionally, “mankind” 
was reduced to “culture,” and by “culture” one meant “other cultures,” i.e. 
the native, the exotic, etc., which could be studied as objects, i.e., more or 
less scientifically, by the ethnographer.  Cultural anthropology may have 
been somewhat ill-defined, but for years it plausibly held itself forth as a 
discipline, in which objective research was conducted. 
All of these phrases―culture, native, etc.―have become intensely 
problematic since the turn to interpretation that anthropology took 
during the ‘80s, which we might call, by way of short-hand, the “Writing 
Culture” critiques, after the book of essays edited by James Clifford and 
George Marcus.  As suggested above, there was a parallel, and less 
successful, moment in law, known as Critical Legal Studies. 
At the same time, the material conditions that cultural anthropology 
was devised to interrogate―the native, the exotic, the entire 
Malinowskian gig―sank into the swamp of globalization.  The native was 
affected by the metropole; the metropole itself seemed in need of 
ethnographic inquiry.  Confusion proliferated.  In certain intellectual 
quarters, the working presumptions that had sustained cultural 
anthropology in fact (university sophisticate reports on native practices 
and their meaning in a scholarly idiom) came to seem implausible, even 
politically suspect.  “What does it mean to do anthropology today?” 
became a good question. 
In more official but perhaps less thoughtful quarters, of course, it 
was and is maintained that all is well with anthropology.  University 
bureaucracy can have it no other way, at least not without massive 
disruption, which is to be avoided.  So the university will without a doubt 
continue to pursue “excellence” in cultural anthropology, as in all else.   
More seriously, however, there did and does seem to be much that 
was truly important in the traditional anthropological project, colonial 
associations and all, much that should be saved even though the world 
and our sensibilities have shifted.  Rephrased, refunctioning ethnography, 
profoundly revising it yet preserving, somehow, its heart, has come to 
seem a worthy project to any number of contemporary anthropologists.  
Which brings us fairly close to the raison d’etre of this journal, which 
implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) asks how could cultural 
anthropology, and more specifically ethnography, reinvent itself in order 
to engage “present situations,” including contemporary business life? 
Asked explicitly, the problem is easily abstracted, yielding 
theoretical questions:  can we articulate a philosophy of new-fangled 
anthropology, and conversely, describe a possible practice of such 
anthropology in general terms?  One set of answers, based on 
conversations with George Marcus and Doug Holmes, is articulated in my 
book, Navigators of the Contemporary: Why Ethnography Matters.  For 
whatever it may be worth, in that book and since, I have explored what 
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such answers might mean for my own discipline, law, and for intellectual 
and political life more generally.  But I digress. 
Like law, cultural anthropology lost much of its pretension to be an 
objective and sharply delineated discipline, and came to understand itself 
as comprising inherently interpretive, and hence somewhat vague and 
sentimental, inquiries, in the hope that non-anthropologists have 
answers.  In short, open. 
 
III. How Are Contemporary Law and Anthropology Alike? 
Quite apart from their openness, law and anthropology are alike in 
another way: the temporality of their foci.  Both law and anthropology of 
the contemporary often focus on the emergent, the assemblage, the 
present and often quite fluid situations that people in contemporary 
societies construct together.  Businesses are an important example, as the 
existence of this journal attests. 
Such “present situations” are often unbearably complex.  For 
example, the instructions to banks for applying the “Volcker Rule” 
regarding permissible investment of moneys under their control run to 
almost 1000 pages, which cannot be completely trusted because open to 
revision.  To make matters worse, the Volcker Rule is a small part of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, itself almost 1000 pages.  In response, the financial 
professions give conferences, experts are established, authoritative 
readings sought and paid for . . . In short, the complexity of large scale, 
profoundly imbricated, seriously influential yet highly regulated 
industries gives rise to the Washington legal practice of discerning, 
articulating and contesting what the relevant players now think the law 
is.   
So the “subjects” of the disciplines―both “law” and “culture”―turn 
out to be inherently ill-defined, because the emergent has, by definition, 
not yet emerged.  The not yet arrived is not quite here; the status quo (for 
this moment, which will not last long) is not easy to discern.  One may of 
course overdo the point; history is unavoidable.  Surely people have 
commitments and understandings on the basis of which they conduct 
their affairs, but such foundations are incomplete, vague, contested―and 
evolving.   What, after all, did (or does) the US Constitution, to say nothing 
of “the Treaties” that constitute the EU, mean?  What does it mean to say 
that a society is, say, “liberal,” or, heaven forefend, “modern”? 
Understanding the near future as a foggy extension of a hazy past to 
be the object, or perhaps terrain, of inquiry and contestation means that 
legal and anthropological scholarship comprises more or less tough-
minded description, with more than a bit of speculation.  It is a bit vain to 
think of this as “research” in the classical sense to which Wissenschaft 
aspired―simply too much critical judgment is involved, to say nothing of 
hope and fears, and normative tendencies under the best of 
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circumstances―how do we feel about the world we sense is emerging?  
This intense interest in a future that is not yet completely decided, 
and about which we may believe many things, goes far to explain why law 
did not become―despite many efforts―a social science.  But while the 
desire for reform is front and center in US legal scholarship, the 
engagement (things could be better, if we only. . .) runs, by definition, 
through engaged scholarship.  At which point the claim that the scholar 
simply “knows” becomes risible.  The pertinent question is why should 
we believe this scholar’s claim that what she believes she knows is 
important?  Why should we feel similarly about the matter? 
This lack of intellectual definition provides opportunities to work as 
an intellectual in a wide variety of ways and settings.  As the objects of 
thought emerge in shifting fashion, the mix of ways we think about such 
objects is likely to shift, as well.  Some approaches will seem more or less 
trenchant at different times; at other times, other approaches may make 
more sense.  For that reason, I strongly support the “welcome” that 
Moeran and Garsten provided at the launch of this journal, in which 
“business anthropology” was seen as a terrain on which people from 
various backgrounds and with diverse research credentials could meet 
and talk in thoughtful but straightforward English about the meaning of 
trade.  What Moeran and Garsten did not do, and have struggled not to do 
since, is declare business anthropology to be its own subdiscipline, which 
would require lots of effort to maintain the inescapably arbitrary 
definition, police the jurisdiction.  It is not only easier but deeper to 
provide a space for thinking together as best we can, as the occasion 
arises. 
 
IV. Conclusion:  Refunctioned ethnography can help law; law can 
help cultural anthropology 
In order to operate in complex present situations, people must tell 
themselves stories about the lay of the land―they must be 
“ethnographers unto themselves.”  This is particularly true in present 
situations, i.e., just presenting themselves, and therefore not yet well-
mapped by traditional narratives. 
What George Marcus and Doug  Holmes call “paraethnography” 
seeks to utilize these “lay” articulations of social structure to construct an 
academic account of the situation (or assemblage, etc.).   For example, the 
understanding within a company of what it is/means/requires to develop 
and market a new perfume might be articulated by those involved, and 
then reworked by the ethnographer into a text to be read by academics, 
people who have neither developed nor marketed anything. 
Paraethnography thus provides a way of making the contemporary 
cognizable within the academy, that is, supporting the kinds of production 
required by academics.  It is a way to continue to do ethnography at the 




All this is well and good for anthropologists, but even more 
interestingly for my purposes, paraethnography could matter for the 
practice of law and politics.  Specifically, paraethnography could give 
regulators (and the rest of us) purchase on the complex environments 
that they seek to secure.  For example, once we realize that Basel III is so 
complex as to be fundamentally unclear as text, then the question 
becomes what do those in power understand in fact―some understanding 
is unavoidable, some law is enforced?  What is the lore?  Ethnography can 
articulate that.   In principle (but not in current practice) there is no 
reason that such understandings could not become the basis of 
regulation, i.e., liability, and institutional control.  (Especially the 
prudential regulation of large financial institutions.)  And this is the kind 
of point that makes ethnography far more important, both politically and 
intellectually, than anthropologists seem to realize―ethnography seems 
to be one of the few ways to gain a substantive, internal, purchase on the 
bureaucracies that conduct so much modern politics, perhaps even a way 
of doing sensible if not enlightened politics in a post-enlightened age, of 
making some sense, for example, of our “defense” policy. 
At the same time, I think law has something valuable for cultural 
(and social) anthropology.  Cultural anthropologists might begin (are 
beginning?) to understand the law not as a form that fails to describe the 
social, or worse, that fails to achieve “social justice” (bracketing “asocial 
justice”) or, in zombie Marxian fashion, as mere superstructure serving 
the interests of the powerful, defined somehow otherwise.  Instead, it 
would be useful for anthropologists to understand law as doctrine in the 
theological sense, a formalization of belief, and hence a fairly straight path 
into the heart of the social.  Law is serious business.  Law is established 
through expensive political contests; law imposes great costs; law is 
generally backed by the explicit power of the state.  Not everything 
serious, not everything right, is expressed by a law.  But if we ignore laws 
that have fallen into desuetude and remain “dead letter” texts out of 
institutional laziness, those things that are commanded, or fostered, by 
laws do indicate commitments of the powerful.  Consider, in this regard, 
laws mandating spending, or establishing an agency and giving it 
jurisdiction over some aspect of social life.  And so even a superficial 
reading of the law can bring us pretty close to understanding the vitals of 
what used to be called, without irony, culture. 
It is important for present purposes to emphasize that I am talking 
about fairly straightforward readings (“superficial” is perhaps too strong) 
of the law.  I am not talking about “what the law really means,” despite 
what it says.   What statutes, decisions, regulations and officials (including 
judges, government officials, and even corporate officers) say, in public 
and baldly, is important.  This also has a practical benefit for cultural 
anthropologists: such statements are public.  One does not need to travel, 
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much less acquire special access, to begin thinking about what an 
investment bank or a general staff, for examples, claim to believe, how 
such groups present, and in that sense understand, themselves.  Thus, for 
those who care to understand power, a bit of attention to what law and 
those authorized by law say could go some distance toward ameliorating 
the problems of access to powerful figures in business (and other) 
fieldwork sites of interest to contemporary anthropology. 
Let me conclude.  In confronting the complexities of contemporary 
life, it is to be hoped that legal thought and even regulatory practice will 
take a paraethnographic turn.  Conversely, perhaps cultural 
anthropologists will more readily comprehend law as the formalization of 
belief, and hence the ways that laws, or their substrate, everywhere 
inform social practices, including the practices of academics.  There is a 
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